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)

NOS. 44781, 44782
KOOTENAI COUNTY NOS. CR 2013-5332,
CR 2015-14399
APPELLANT’S BRIEF

STATEMENT OF THE CASE
Nature of the Case
Following Mr. Boggs’s Alford1 plea to aggravated assault and domestic battery, the
district court sentenced him to an aggregate sentence of ten years, with two years fixed. The
district court also revoked his probation in another, earlier case and executed imposition of that
ten-year fixed sentence. The district court ordered the two ten-year sentences to run
consecutively and retained jurisdiction (“a rider”). At the rider review hearing, the district court
relinquished jurisdiction. Mr. Boggs then filed an Idaho Criminal Rule 35 (“Rule 35”) motion,
which the district court denied. Mr. Boggs now appeals to this Court. He argues the district court
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North Carolina v. Alford, 400 U.S. 25 (1970).
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abused its discretion by imposing an excessive sentence, by relinquishing jurisdiction, and by
denying his Rule 35 motion.

Statement of Facts and Course of Proceedings
In 2013, Mr. Boggs pled guilty to driving under the influence of drugs (“DUI”), a felony,
in violation of I.C. §§ 18-8004, -8005(6) (No. 47781, CR 2013-5332). (R., pp.42–44, 45–46, 56–
58.) The district court sentenced him to ten years fixed, suspended execution of the sentence, and
placed him on probation. (R., pp.56–58.)
In October of 2015, Mr. Boggs entered an Alford plea to new charges of aggravated
assault and domestic battery (No. 47782, CR 2015-14399). (R., pp.258–59; Tr. Vol. I,2 p.13,
L.19–p.20, L.9.) The State also moved to revoke Mr. Boggs’s probation in the 2013 case.
(R., pp.133–36, 156–57.)
In May of 2016, the district court held a joint evidentiary hearing, probation violation
disposition, and sentencing hearing. (See generally Tr. Vol. I, p.21, L.1–p.50, L.25.) The district
court found Mr. Boggs willfully violated his probation for failing to complete community service
and committing the two new offenses. (Tr. Vol. I, p.30, L.20–p.32, L.1.) The district court then
revoked Mr. Boggs’s probation in the 2013 case and executed imposition of the ten-year
sentence. (Tr. Vol. I, p.45, L.23–l.46, L.2.) For the new 2015 case, the district court sentenced
Mr. Boggs to ten years, with two years fixed, for domestic battery and five years, with two years
fixed, for aggravated assault. (Tr. Vol. I, p.46, Ls.2–9, p.48, L.18–p.49, L.4.) These sentences
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There are two transcripts on appeal. The first, cited as Volume I, contains the entry of plea
hearing, held on October 7, 2015, the evidentiary hearing, probation violation disposition, and
sentencing hearing, held on May 18, 2016, and the rider review hearing, held on December 5,
2016. The second transcript, cited as Volume II, contains the Rule 35 motion hearing, held on
July 31, 2017.
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would run concurrently, but consecutive to the 2013 sentence, for a total aggregate sentence
twenty years, with twelve years fixed. (Tr. Vol. I, p.46, Ls.9–11.) The district court retained
jurisdiction in both cases. (Tr. Vol. I, p.46, Ls.15–16; see also R., pp.164–67, 290–93
(judgments).)
In December of 2016, the district court held a rider review hearing. (Tr. Vol. I, p.51, L.1–
p.69, L.9.) The district court relinquished jurisdiction in both cases and imposed Mr. Boggs’s
sentences. (Tr. Vol. I, p.67, Ls.4–14.) The district court entered orders of relinquishment in both
cases on December 5, 2016. (R., pp.173–74, 310–11.) Mr. Boggs timely appealed. (R., pp.177–
80, 312–14.) On January 13, 2017, Mr. Boggs filed a Rule 35 motion in both cases. (R., pp.175,
319.) He subsequently filed a pro se Rule 35 supplement. (Aug. R., Def.’s ICR 35 Supp.) The
district court held a hearing on Mr. Boggs’s motion on July 31, 2017. (Tr. Vol. II, p.3, L.1–p.24,
L.8.) Mr. Boggs requested the district court place him on probation or retain jurisdiction again.
(Tr. Vol. II, p.14, Ls.6–8, p.16, Ls.12–15.) Alternatively, Mr. Boggs requested the district court
reduce his sentence in the 2013 case to ten years, with two years fixed, and, in the new 2015
case, order that sentence to run concurrent (rather than consecutive) to the 2013 sentence.
(Tr. Vol. II, p.16, L.21–p.17, L.15.) The State did not oppose running the sentences concurrently.
(Tr. Vol. II, p.19, Ls.12–13.) After taking the matter under advisement, the district court issued
an order denying the motion. (Aug. R., Order Denying I.C.R. 35 Mot. and Notice of Right to
Appeal.)
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ISSUES
I.

Did the district court abuse its discretion when it sentenced Mr. Boggs to an aggregate
sentence of ten years, with two years fixed, for aggravated assault and domestic battery?

II.

Did the district court abuse its discretion when it relinquished jurisdiction?

III.

Did the district court abuse its discretion when it denied Mr. Boggs’s Rule 35 motion?

ARGUMENT
I.
The District Court Abused Its Discretion When It Sentenced Mr. Boggs To An Aggregate
Sentence Of Ten Years, With Two Years Fixed, For Aggravated Assault And Domestic Battery
“It is well-established that ‘[w]here a sentence is within statutory limits, an appellant has
the burden of showing a clear abuse of discretion on the part of the court imposing the
sentence.’” State v. Pierce, 150 Idaho 1, 5 (2010) (quoting State v. Jackson, 130 Idaho 293, 294
(1997) (alteration in original)). Here, Mr. Boggs’s aggregate sentence does not exceed the
statutory maximum. See I.C. § 18-906 (five year maximum for aggravated assault); I.C. § 18918(2)(b) (ten year maximum for domestic battery). Accordingly, to show that the sentence
imposed was unreasonable, Mr. Boggs “must show that the sentence, in light of the governing
criteria, is excessive under any reasonable view of the facts.” State v. Strand, 137 Idaho 457, 460
(2002).
“‘Reasonableness’ of a sentence implies that a term of confinement should be tailored to
the purpose for which the sentence is imposed.” State v. Adamcik, 152 Idaho 445, 483 (2012)
(quoting State v. Stevens, 146 Idaho 139, 148 (2008)).
In examining the reasonableness of a sentence, the Court conducts an independent
review of the entire record available to the trial court at sentencing, focusing on
the objectives of criminal punishment: (1) protection of society; (2) deterrence of
the individual and the public; (3) possibility of rehabilitation; and (4) punishment
or retribution for wrongdoing.
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Stevens, 146 Idaho at 148. “A sentence is reasonable if it appears necessary to accomplish the
primary objective of protecting society and to achieve any or all of the related goals of
deterrence, rehabilitation, or retribution.” State v. Delling, 152 Idaho 122, 132 (2011). “The
decision of whether to impose sentences concurrently or consecutively is within the sound
discretion of the trial court.” State v. Helms, 130 Idaho 32, 35 (Ct. App. 1997); see also
I.C. § 18-308. Similarly, “[t]he choice of probation, among available sentencing alternatives, is
committed to the sound discretion of the trial court . . . .” State v. Landreth, 118 Idaho 613, 615
(Ct. App. 1990).
Here, Mr. Boggs asserts the district court abused its discretion by imposing an excessive
sentence under any reasonable view of the facts. Specifically, he contends the district court
should have sentenced him to a lesser term of imprisonment or placed him on probation in light
of the mitigating factors, including his severe medical condition, focus on rehabilitation, and
supportive relationship.
Mr. Boggs’s poor health warranted a lesser sentence. See State v. Turner, 136 Idaho 629,
636 (Ct. App. 2011) (noting the defendant’s poor health was a mitigating factor considered by
the district court). In 2013, Mr. Boggs was diagnosed with two autoimmune diseases: Takayasu
Arteritis and Rheumatoid Vaculitis. (No. 44782 PSI,3 p.44.) The November 2015 PSI explained
that one of Mr. Boggs’s medications caused severe tumors in his stomach and required the
removal of thirteen inches of his intestines. (No. 44782 PSI, p.46.) He was unable to work due to
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The confidential exhibits for No. 44781 and No. 44782 were filed separately. As such, the
confidential exhibits for No. 44781 will be cited as “No. 44781 PSI” and refer to the 114-page
electronic document with that case’s confidential exhibits. Likewise, the confidential exhibits for
No. 44782 will be cited as “No. 44782 PSI” and refer to the 117-page electronic document with
that case’s confidential exhibits.
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his intestinal problems and received disability benefits. (No. 44782 PSI, p.44.) Mr. Boggs’s had
five stomach surgeries and a sixth surgery already scheduled at the time of the November 2015
PSI. (No. 44782 PSI, p.46.) This sixth surgery would attempt to reconnect his intestines. (No.
44782 PSI, p.46.) Similarly, Mr. Boggs reported in the GAIN evaluation that he had thirty
emergency room visits, thirty hospital admissions, and ten outpatient surgical procedures. (No.
44782 PSI, p.76.) By the time of sentencing in May of 2016, his attorney explained that
Mr. Boggs had been hospitalized for seven months to remove several tumors. (Tr. Vol. I, p.27,
Ls.1–5, p.44, Ls.5–7.) He underwent fifteen procedures during that seven-month stay. (Tr. Vol. I,
p.27, Ls.7–10, p.44, L.7.) At the time of sentencing, Mr. Boggs had “two open wounds,” a
colostomy bag, and an ostomy bag. (Tr., Vol. I, p.43, Ls.9–12.) Mr. Boggs’s severe, lifethreatening condition necessitated that he be released in the community so he could obtain the
proper treatment. If not treated properly, these open wounds could “kill him.” (Tr. Vol. I, p.43,
Ls.11–12.) Mr. Boggs’s medical condition was a strong mitigating factor in favor of a lesser term
of imprisonment or probation.
The district court failed to give adequate weight to this factor at sentencing. In fact, the
district court stated:
I don’t think that you’ve or your attorney have made this an issue about your
physical condition.4 Your physical condition is what your physical condition is,
and I have over my fifteen years really not taken that into account. I’ve obviously
sent people to prison that are in worse physical shape than you, and I realize fully
that that’s going to be a huge financial burden on the state taxpayer. That’s never
been a factor for me. It’s not a factor for me in making this decision and this
decision here regarding you. I hope you get better. I hope you come back with
some more tools. . . .

4

Mr. Boggs’s attorney argued at sentencing that the district court should place Mr. Boggs on
probation or retain jurisdiction “not based solely on his medical condition,” but also his
likelihood of rehabilitation. (Tr. Vol. I, p.41, Ls.11–14.)
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(Tr. Vol. I, p.47, L.15–p.48, L.1.) Based on this language, the district court explicitly declined to
give sufficient weight to Mr. Boggs’s poor health. The Idaho Court of Appeals, however, has
held that a defendant’s health problems should be considered by the sentencing court. See
State v. James, 112 Idaho 239, 243–44 (Ct. App. 1986) (“Although rehabilitation and health
problems are factors to consider in a motion for reduction of a sentence, they are not necessarily
determining factors.”); State v. Anderson, 111 Idaho 121, 123 (Ct. App. 1986) (“Although
rehabilitation and health difficulties may be factors to weigh in considering a motion for
reduction of sentence, they are not necessarily controlling.”). By failing to sufficiently weigh this
factor in Mr. Boggs’s case, the district court did not act consistently with the applicable legal
standards and therefore abused its discretion by imposing an excessive sentence.
Moreover, other mitigating circumstances supported a more lenient sentence for
Mr. Boggs. For example, his wife provided a stable support system. (Tr. Vol. I, p.42, Ls.11–17;
No. 44782 PSI, p.117.) She was “by his side in the hospital” and throughout the legal
proceedings. (Tr. Vol. I, p.42, Ls.11–17.) In addition, Mr. Boggs was fully committed to
rehabilitation. He participated in Drug Court for one year starting in 2013. (No. 44782 PSI, p.48)
He graduated in July of 2014. (Tr. Vol. I, p.26, Ls.24–25.) Although he was medically
discharged from the program, “it was considered successfully completed.” (No. 44782 PSI,
p.39.) A licensed social worker wrote that Mr. Boggs transformed during his treatment while in
Drug Court. (No. 44782 PSI, p.1.) The social worker stated that Mr. Boggs met all requirements
of his treatment. (No. 44782 PSI, p.1.) The social worker also stated that Mr. Boggs continued to
meet with her even after he completed Drug Court. (No. 44782 PSI, p.1.) While Mr. Boggs
received treatment for his autoimmune diseases, he “always” stayed in contact with his treatment
provider and kept the Drug Court team informed of his medical issues and medications. (No.
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44782 PSI, p.1.) The social worker summarized, “Brad has fought very hard to complete the
Drug Court Program despite the struggles of the disease.” (No. 44782 PSI, p.1.) Similarly, a
counselor with Good Samaritan Rehabilitation wrote that he had been meeting regularly with
Mr. Boggs since his hospitalization. (No. 44782 PSI, p.3.) The counselor, who had known
Mr. Boggs for twelve years, explained:
Mr. Boggs has been through a tremendous amount of pain and near death
experiences that have brought forth a new perspective in Brad concerning his faith
in God. During Brad’s first couple weeks in the hospital he made the most
pivoting decision of his life and committed his life to Jesus Christ. After this
event took place things got worse for Brad as he caught pneumonia, when [sic]
through multiple surgeries and his faith was tested. Stepping into this new
commitment, Brad’s heart has become willing to forsake all that he was and used
to stand for in the past. As I walk with Brad through the cost of following after
Jesus it is emphasized on how much of a serious commitment this is and what
hangs on the line. His reputation, relationship with old friends, pride, and
everything he use [sic] to know. Brad is real and has always been an extremist, I
am sure that the zeal that this man has will be used to influence and impact people
in a positive way when directed towards God. Brad has expressed to me a desire
to participate in the My Choice Panel for troubled youth in our community. I
know that this man’s story has a lot to offer in terms of helping young kids to
steer clear from a life of trouble. As I continue to meet with Brad he shows
evidence of new found [sic] hope and outlook concerning life itself. I pray that
this letter will be taken into consideration concerning decisions about Mr. Boggs.
(No. 44782 PSI, p.3.) Another letter from the director of Good Samaritan Rehabilitation, dated
November 11, 2015, wrote that Mr. Boggs would be welcome to return to the program once he
was fully recovered from his surgery. (No. 44782 PSI, p.11.)
With regard to treatment, Mr. Boggs wrote that he had full BPA funding to attend the
Walker Center or Port of Hope. (No. 44782 PSI, p.117.) His “relationship with God,” “continued
sobriety,” and children were very important to him. (No. 44782 PSI, p.49.) He wrote to the
district court that he wanted “to make the most of the future.” (No. 44782 PSI, p.117.) He
explained that he only had a “few years left to live” due to the autoimmune diseases so he hoped
to “improve my quality of life until I pass.” (No. 44782 PSI, p.117.) He wrote, “I will do

8

ANYTHING, mental health court, in patient, etc. . . . I long to live a different life [and] not in a
cell until my dying days. I ask for the chance to have my surgeries [and] move on with my life.”
(No. 44782 PSI, p.117 (capitalization and ellipsis in original).) Mr. Boggs’s supportive
relationship with his wife, his past success in Drug Court, commitment to the Good Samaritan
Program, and focus on rehabilitation all support a lesser sentence. The district court abused its
discretion by failing to give adequate weight to these mitigating circumstances. The aggregate
sentence of ten years, with two years fixed—to be served consecutive to another fixed ten-year
sentence—was excessive under the circumstances, especially Mr. Boggs’s failing health.

II.
The District Court Abused Its Discretion When It Relinquished Jurisdiction
The district court’s decision whether to retain jurisdiction and place the defendant on
probation or relinquish jurisdiction is reviewed for an abuse of discretion. State v. Brunet, 155
Idaho 724, 729 (2013); see also I.C. § 19-2601(4). “A court’s decision to relinquish jurisdiction
will not be deemed an abuse of discretion if the trial court has sufficient information to determine
that a suspended sentence and probation would be inappropriate.” State v. Hansen, 154 Idaho
882, 889 (Ct. App. 2013).
Here, the district court abused its discretion by relinquishing jurisdiction over Mr. Boggs.
Although he had several informal sanctions (mostly verbal warnings), he received no formal
disciplinary sanctions. (No. 44782 PSI, p.98.) Similarly, although the Addendum to the PSI
(“APSI”) reported that Mr. Boggs had numerous absences, he asserted that those absences were
for medical reasons. (No. 44782 PSI, pp.99–100.) It seems it was very challenging, if not
impossible, for Mr. Boggs to attend all required programming while also going to his unit’s sickcall times to receive necessary medical care. Mr. Boggs’s unit had only one open sick call time at
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10:00 a.m., but his programming began at 9:30 a.m. (2nd Aug. R., “New Open Sick Call Times”;
Tr. Vol. I, p.61, Ls.7–10.) As he explained at the rider review hearing, “[t]he only classes I
missed was because I was in – the open call sick time was the only time I could receive supplies
for my colostomy bag.” (Tr. Vol. I, p.64, Ls.17–20.) Mr. Boggs tried to fix this scheduling
conflict while on the rider. For example, Mr. Boggs obtained a note from his counselor asking
that he be allowed to change his sick call time so he could attend his classes. (2nd Aug. R., Mr.
Leigh Letter.) This counselor also wrote that Mr. Boggs had medical excuses for missed classes
and “presents to class with a good attitude and has been a regular contributor in most every class
discussion and all three phases of this class.” (No. 44782 PSI, p.110.) In addition, Mr. Boggs
obtained permission to change his sick-call time, but apparently he was turned away by the
medical providers. (2nd Aug. R., Offender Concern Forms to Lt. Greenland; Tr. Vol. I, p.61,
L.11–p.62, L.5.) Therefore, it appears many of Mr. Boggs’s issues on the rider were based on his
difficulties with obtaining proper medical care and his frustrations due to the scheduling
conflicts. In fact, Mr. Boggs initially did very well on the rider. He was “very respectful to staff
and has volunteered to help with janitorial duties.” (No. 44782 PSI, p.116.)

He did “an

outstanding job” when housed in a different unit. (No. 44782 PSI, p.116.) In light of this
information, the district court should not have relinquished jurisdiction. The district court should
have kept Mr. Boggs on the rider and allowed him to continue his programming.

III.
The District Court Abused Its Discretion When It Denied Mr. Boggs’s Rule 35 Motion
“A Rule 35 motion for reduction of sentence is essentially a plea for leniency, addressed
to the sound discretion of the court.” State v. Carter, 157 Idaho 900, 903 (Ct. App. 2014). In
reviewing the grant or denial of a Rule 35 motion, the Court must “consider the entire record and
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apply the same criteria used for determining the reasonableness of the original sentence.” Id. The
Court “conduct[s] an independent review of the record, having regard for the nature of the
offense, the character of the offender and the protection of the public interest.” State v. Burdett,
134 Idaho 271, 276 (Ct. App. 2000). “Where an appeal is taken from an order refusing to reduce
a sentence under Rule 35,” the Court’s scope of review “includes all information submitted at the
original sentencing hearing and at the subsequent hearing held on the motion to reduce.” State v.
Araiza, 109 Idaho 188, 189 (Ct. App. 1985). “When presenting a Rule 35 motion, the defendant
must show that the sentence is excessive in light of new or additional information subsequently
provided to the district court in support of the Rule 35 motion.” State v. Huffman, 144 Idaho 201,
203 (2007).
Here, Mr. Boggs provided the district court with new and additional information that
supported a reduction of his sentence, including probation.5 At the Rule 35 motion hearing,
Mr. Boggs testified that he could live with his stepmother or the Set Apart House while he
waited to get funding for Good Samaritan. (Tr. Vol. II, p.6, L.11–p.7, L.10.) Mr. Boggs had
some of the funding available, but he had been unable to secure the rest of the funding due to his
incarceration after the rider. (Tr. Vol. II, p.6, Ls.14–16, p.6, L.22–p.7, L.1.) If placed back on
probation, Mr. Boggs understood that he would have to enter the Good Samaritan program.
(Tr. Vol. II, p.7, Ls.2–5.) He also testified that he would continue mental health treatment and
one-on-one counseling for his anger issues. (Tr. Vol. II, p.7, Ls.11–18.) Moreover, Mr. Boggs
had prepaid for orientation and at least eight domestic violence classes with the Abundant

5

At the Rule 35 motion hearing, Mr. Boggs also argued the district court should retain
jurisdiction, but this type of relief is foreclosed by State v. Flores, 162 Idaho 298 (2017). As
such, Mr. Boggs maintains that the district court should have placed him on probation or reduced
his sentence.
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Wellness Center. (Tr. Vol. II, p.7, L.19–p.8, L.7.) In addition, Mr. Boggs’s most recent surgery
successfully reversed his colostomy bag. (Tr. Vol. II, p.8, Ls.13–22.) He took an
“immunosuppressant, chemo type pill” for his vasculitis, as well as mental health medication.
(Tr. Vol. II, p.8, L.23–p.9, L.2.) He did not foresee any other surgeries. (Tr. Vol. II, p.9, Ls.3–7.)
This new and additional information showed Mr. Boggs had the motivation, tools, and stabilized
medical condition in order to succeed on probation.
Additionally, Mr. Boggs provided the district court with more information regarding his
alleged poor performance on the rider. He submitted two IDOC Offender Concern forms at the
rider review hearing. In one form, Mr. Boggs stated that, in the APSI, he was portrayed as
disruptive and refusing to attend the Cognitive-Behavioral Interventions for Substance Abuse
class (“CBISA”). (2nd Aug. R., Offender Concern Form to Mr. Thomas.) The responding staff
wrote that Mr. Boggs only attended the class a few times, but he was not disruptive. (2nd Aug.
R., Offender Concern Form to Mr. Thomas.) In the other form, Mr. Boggs stated that the APSI
falsely reported his bad behavior in class. (2nd Aug. R., Offender Concern Form to Ms. Hoyle.)
The responding staff wrote that Mr. Boggs was not enrolled in CBISA long enough for the staff
to give any feedback about his responsivity to treatment. (2nd Aug. R., Ms. Hoyle Letter.) This
information called into question the negative remarks in the APSI and showed Mr. Boggs was
dedicated to the rider programming, despite his challenges with his medical condition.
Further, in his Rule 35 supplement, Mr. Boggs provided the district court with additional
information his medical condition and rider experience. Mr. Boggs explained that he had two
types of vasculitis, one is rare and the other is terminal. (Aug. R., Def.’s ICR 35 Supp., p.3.) In
2015, he was given seven years to live. (Aug. R., Def.’s ICR 35 Supp., pp.3–4, 8.) Due to the
district court’s decision to run the sentences consecutively, Mr. Boggs was serving a twenty-year
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sentence, with twelve years fixed, now with only five years left to live. Further, Mr. Boggs’s
medical condition drastically impacted his rider performance. During the first two months of the
rider, Mr. Boggs attended classes with his “intestines hanging out.” (Aug. R., Def.’s ICR 35
Supp., p.4.) Mr. Boggs then had surgery and afterwards had to attend classes with seventy-two
staples in his stomach. (Aug. R., Def.’s ICR 35 Supp., p.4.) His programming conflicted with his
unit’s sick-call times, which he needed to clean his wounds and colostomy bag. (Aug. R., Def.’s
ICR 35 Supp., p.4.) Mr. Boggs believed he was removed from his classes because of this
conflict. (Aug. R., Def.’s ICR 35 Supp., p.5.) Mr. Boggs averred that he tried to fix the
scheduling problems so it would not interfere with his programming. (Aug. R., Def.’s ICR 35
Supp., p.5.)
Consistent with Mr. Boggs’s experience on the rider, his case manager for Thinking for a
Change wrote a very positive review of his performance. He wrote:
Mr. Boggs was an active and participating member of the class while he
attended. He completed approximately 12 of the class’s 25 sessions before
informing me that his health was prohibiting him from attending. Prior to that, his
attendance was excellent and the work he completed was of good quality; it was
evident that he was grasping the material and putting thought and effort into what
he did.
Mr. Boggs came to class with a positive attitude and willingly participated
in roleplays where offenders get to try out newly acquired skills with their peers
in a safe environment. . . . Mr. Boggs readily participated and regularly
volunteered to assist me when I was performing models of skills for the class to
view before they practiced the concepts themselves. Some of the skills Mr. Boggs
was able to practice in class included recognizing one’s feelings, understanding
the feelings of others, active listening, and giving feedback.
Mr. Boggs was present for the cognitive self-change portion of the
curriculum, where he learned to recognize risky situations, pay attention to risky
thoughts, and employ the use of new thinking to reduce his risk of impulsive,
dangerous behavior. On several occasions, Mr. Boggs was able to present how he
had used concepts from the program outside of class to avoid altercations with
other inmates.
During the time that Mr. Boggs was able to maintain attendance, he was a
pleasure to have in my class.
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(Aug. R., Def.’s Rule 35 Supp., p.21.) This information demonstrated that, although Mr. Boggs
had challenges, he was committed to his recovery and rehabilitation.
Ultimately, the district court abused its discretion by denying Mr. Boggs’s Rule 35
motion. This new and additional information—Mr. Boggs’s housing options, mental health and
substance abuse treatment plans, improved medical condition, and positive aspects of his rider
performance—showed he could be rehabilitated in the community under proper control and
supervision. This information also supported a reduction in Mr. Boggs’s sentence, such as
changing the 2013 and 2015 sentences to run concurrent to each other, rather than consecutive.6

6

In denying Mr. Boggs’s Rule 35 motion, the district court also ruled that his motion was
untimely. (Aug. R., Order Denying I.C.R. 35 Mot. and Notice of Right to Appeal, pp.3–4.)
However, Mr. Boggs filed his Rule 35 motion within the timeframe set by the rule. Rule 35
states, “Within 120 days of the entry of the judgment imposing sentence or order releasing
retained jurisdiction, a motion may be filed to correct or reduce a sentence and the court may
correct or reduce the sentence.” I.C.R. 35(b) (emphasis added). Here, the orders relinquishing
jurisdiction were filed on December 5, 2016, and the Rule 35 motions were filed on January 13,
2017. (R., pp.173–74, 175, 310–11, 319.) Thus, Mr. Boggs filed his Rule 35 motions thirty-nine
days after the entry of the orders relinquishing jurisdiction. This is well-within the 120-day time
frame.
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CONCLUSION
Mr. Boggs respectfully requests that this Court reduce his sentence in the 2015 case as it
deems appropriate. Alternatively, he respectfully requests that this Court vacate the district
court’s judgment of conviction and remand the 2015 case for a new sentencing hearing. In the
alternative, he respectfully requests that this Court vacate the district court’s orders relinquishing
jurisdiction or its orders denying his Rule 35 motion and remand these cases for further
proceedings.
DATED this 16th day of November, 2017.

__________/s/_______________
JENNY C. SWINFORD
Deputy State Appellate Public Defender
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